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Abstract 
A common problem in risk analysis is to characterize the overall security of a system of 
valuable assets (e.g., government buildings or communication hubs), and to suggest 
measures to mitigate any hazards or security threats. Currently, analysts typically rely on 
a combination of indices, such as resilience, robustness, redundancy, security, and 
vulnerability. However, these indices are not by themselves sufficient as a guide to 
action; for example, while it is possible to develop policies to decrease vulnerability, such 
policies may not always be cost-effective.   
Motivated by this gap, we propose a new index, defensibility. A system is 
considered defensible to the extent that a modest investment can significantly reduce 
the damage from an attack or disruption. To compare systems whose performance is not 
readily commensurable (e.g., the electrical grid vs. the water-distribution network, both of 
which are critical, but which provide distinct types of services), we defined defensibility 
as a dimensionless index.   
After defining defensibility quantitatively, we illustrate how the defensibility of a 
system depends on factors such as the defender and attacker asset valuations, the 
nature of the threat (whether intelligent and adaptive, or random), and the levels of 
attack and defense strengths and provide analytical results that support the observations 
arising from the above illustrations. Overall, we argue that the defensibility of a system is 
an important dimension to consider when evaluating potential defensive investments, 
and that it can be applied in a variety of different contexts. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the central concerns of the fields of security studies and risk analysis is 
protecting a set of critical assets or a system from disruptions or attacks (E. Banks, 
2005; Haimes, 2016).  The assets might be, for example, components of a critical 
infrastructure system, facilities, or concentrations of people; the disruption might be 
accidental/natural or deliberate, physical or cyber.  In the case of deliberate attacks, the 
defender invests resources to protect the system while the attackers select targets in 
order to maximize some objective function related to the damage expected from the 
attacks. The case of natural events is similar, except that the attack is modeled as a 
stationary threat rather than responding to defense investments.    
It has also been observed (Bier et al., 2007a) that, in some systems, the 
defender may lack the ability to tangibly improve the security of a system, even with a 
substantial budget of resources. This may occur when many alternative valuable targets 
exist, and an adaptive attacker can find and switch to an unprotected target.  Indeed, 
certain modes of terrorism such as knife and car attacks are virtually unstoppable in the 
sense that the attacker can always find a weak or undefended target.  
In this paper we propose to characterize such situations using the new 
theoretical property of defensibility. Namely, we call a system defensible if modest 
investment of resources can significantly improve the outcome to the defender. The 
value of this defensibility measure is that it enables the analyst to determine whether 
investments in defense are the best protection strategy.  If the defensibility is found to be 
low, the defender should instead seek alternative strategies, such as deterrence through 
retaliation (in the case of intentional threats) or effective emergency response.   
Numerous terms have been defined (Haimes, 2016; Zakour & Gillespie, 2013) to 
characterize systems (Table 1).  For example, “vulnerability” has been defined as a 
“physical feature or operational attribute that renders an entity, asset, system, network, 
or geographic area open to exploitation or susceptible to a given hazard” (Beers & Risk 
Steering Committee, 2010), “the conditional probability of success given a threat 
scenario occurs” (US Department of Homeland Security, 2003, sec. 68/126), or “the 
degree to which a system is affected by a risk source or agent” (Aven, 2015).  Note that 
vulnerability is actually in general a vector-valued concept (Haimes, 2006), since a 
system may have different levels of vulnerability to different threats.  However, for a 
sufficiently well-defined threat (e.g., a particular type of attack, by an adversary with a 
given level of capability; or an earthquake with a given peak ground acceleration, 
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direction and magnitude of ground motion, duration, and frequency spectrum), it may be 
reasonable to view vulnerability as a scalar reflecting the likelihood of damage.  
Similarly, Haimes et al. (1998) distinguish between resilience (the ability of a system to 
return to normal rapidly) (Alderson et al., 2015; Helfgott, 2018; Hollnagel et al., 2006; 
National Academies, 2012), robustness (ability to function despite damage) (Haimes, 
2006), redundancy (spare capacity) (Ganin et al., 2016), and security (effectiveness of 
measures to limit access to a system).  
 
Table 1: Comparison of key concepts of risk analysis with defensibility 
Concept Motivating Question(s) 
Defensibility To what extent would strengthening the system reduce 
the attack damage? 
Robustness How well can the system absorb damage?   
Resilience How well could the system recover from damage? 
Security How likely is it that malicious attackers would be 
interdicted? 
Vulnerability How likely is it that a disruptive event or attack would 
cause damage? 
 
In this paper, we propose a new characteristic—defensibility. We see 
defensibility as being in some sense related to changes in expected damage with 
defensive investment. A system can have high expected damage, but be easy to defend, 
or alternatively can be at low risk of damage but difficult to defend. Based on this, we 
argue that the defensibility of a system is an important dimension to consider in security 
analysis.  The concept of defensibility as defined below is simple but novel. Defensibility 
has been previously used only as a qualitative term to discuss the protection of territory 
in military contexts (Ljung et al., 2012) and metaphorically in business, law and 
management strategy. Some authors have looked at risk reduction as a function of 
budget, but in the context of a single system (Jonkman et al., 2003), whereas here we 
propose to quantify defensibility for the purposes of comparing systems.  
In light of defensibility, identifying system vulnerabilities may be of relatively little 
value if the system is not highly defensible (although of course knowing the 
vulnerabilities is necessary to calculate defensibility).  For example, a highly vulnerable 
system may be defensible against some vulnerabilities but not others, or may not be 
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readily defensible at all.  To illustrate this latter point, Salmeron et al. (2004) 
computationally identify the attack strategies that would cause the maximal disruption to 
electricity systems, and propose protecting the system against those attack strategies, 
arguing that ‘‘By considering the largest possible disruptions, our proposed plan will be 
appropriately conservative.’’ However, one of us observed that hardening even a 
significant percentage of an electricity system may not dramatically diminish the damage 
(i.e., load shed) as the result of an intelligent attack (Bier et al., 2007a). Moreover, 
hardening of individual assets may sometimes be less effective than overarching forms 
of protection such as border security (Haphuriwat & Bier, 2011). Thus, it is not clear that 
identifying the most damaging attack strategies will always be a helpful guide to system 
hardening, and other strategies may need to be considered. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. The next section defines defensibility. 
Section 3 applies defensibility to the special case of discrete assets, where the value of 
the system is simply the sum of the asset values. Section 4 explores in depth the 
properties of defensibility using the examples of two systems and a variety of attackers.  
Section 5 analytically proves a variety of properties of defensibility in the discrete asset 
case.  Finally, the paper discusses the results and concludes. 
2. General Formulation 
To define defensibility, we require an attacker, a defender and a system. We presume 
that the attacker has a certain capability or severity that could result in damage to the 
system. In our terminology, we use the word “attack” or “attacker” to refer to deliberate 
and non-deliberate disruptions, hazards or threats, including natural and accidental 
events.  The defender has a certain capability to prevent damage and derives certain 
performance or value from the system. The severity of the damage generally depends 
on the defender and the characteristics of the system. Note that we do not limit our 
analysis of deliberate attacks to the case of zero-sum games; in fact, Section 4.4 below 
explicitly discusses how the results change when the attacker and the defender have 
radically different objective functions.   
We define defensibility as the ability of the defender to reduce the damage to the 
system below some given initial level (corresponding to any preexisting defenses) using 
a given level of defense effort. By damage we mean the difference between the initial 
and final system after an attack or adverse event. The final value is also termed “residual 
value” and is measured in units appropriate for the system in question such as dollars for 
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a set of economic activities, kilowatts for electrical transmission and even lives when 
protecting human lives. The residual value increases with defense investments 
(measured in resource units such as dollars), and so defensibility is concerned with how 
much increasing the defense effort would change the residual value of the system (Fig. 
1). The outcome of the attack need not be deterministic, and may be subject to 
stochastic variation; similarly, the defense investment might be variable or even a game-
theoretic mixed strategy (Lempert et al., 2016). Such stochastic settings can be 
addressed by treating the residual value of the system as an expectation.  For 
calculations of expected damage in various practical cases, see Jonkman et al. (2003). 
Note, however, that the residual value of a system in a stochastic setting need not be 
limited to an expectation, which may not be a good metric for low-probability, high-
consequence risks (Sarin & Weber, 1993).  For example, prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Sunstein, 2003) suggests that public perceptions of terrorism risk are 
relatively insensitive to probabilities, so defensibility might be defined to focus primarily 
on reducing the maximum possible damage, without regard to likelihood.      
From this perspective, defense effort could improve the residual value of the 
system in question by reducing the damage from attacks.  In principle, that could be 
accomplished by multiple different means – all of which can in principle be encompassed 
within our framework:  
 
1. Improving security (increasing the likelihood of interdicting an attack); 
2. Reducing vulnerability (reducing the success likelihood of a given attack type); 
3. Improving robustness (reducing damage given a successful attack); 
4. Improving resilience (reducing the duration of damage); or even  
5. Increasing deterrence (reducing the likelihood that an attack will be attempted). 
 
The concept of defensibility complements the effort to identify critical assets to be 
protected (see for example Ayyub et al., 2007; Banks & Hengartner, 2014; Izuakor & 
White, 2017), particularly when those assets belong to more complex systems 
(Apostolakis & Lemon, 2005; McGill et al., 2007).  In line with that approach, we define 
defensibility for systems, not individual assets or targets.  Hypothetically, one might think 
of an asset as highly defensible if the likelihood or magnitude of damage to that asset 
can be reduced dramatically with only a modest investment—but that is a special case of 
what we define here.  Rather, we are interested in quantifying the defensibility of an 
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entire system with multiple assets. While investment may be implemented at the asset 
level (e.g., a security barrier), the benefit of that investment can be viewed as increasing 
the residual value of the system as a whole. Thus, the concept of defensibility that we 
propose here is an emergent property that can relate in complex ways to the individual 
assets of a system. 
 
    
Fig. 1.  Hypothetical residual value curves for three similar systems having 
differing levels of defensibility. 𝑉(𝑎, 0) and 𝑉(𝑎, 𝑏) are the residual values of the 
system after an attack effort 𝑎 in the cases of zero defense effort and defense effort 𝑏, 
respectively. For example, the upper concave curve represents a highly defensible 
system, where a small defense effort results in a large increase in the residual value of 
the system. Defensibility is proportional to the difference between the curve for residual 
value and the horizontal line corresponding to 𝑉(𝑎, 0), as indicated by the double arrow.   
 
2.1 Quantification of defensibility 
Let 𝑉 be a function expressing the value of the system to the defender. 𝑉 may be 
expressed in system-specific units, such as the number of military bases, megawatts of 
electrical-generation capacity, or ton-miles of cargo throughput.  For a given attack, with 
a given likelihood and severity of damage, the resulting value of the system would be 
degraded (e.g., reflecting loss of services), but if the system was defended, the value 
after an attack is expected to more closely approach the value before any attack. 
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Numerically, let 𝑉(𝑎, 𝑏) be the residual value of the system to the defender when the 
attacker has strength 𝑎 and the defender makes investment 𝑏. If the defender makes no 
defense investments, the residual value is 𝑉(𝑎, 0). If neither player threatens the system, 
the system has a nominal or “initial” value 𝑈, where 𝑈 = 𝑉(0,0). From here we define the 
defensibility of the system by the following function: 
𝐷(𝑎, 𝑏) =
𝑉(𝑎,𝑏)−𝑉(𝑎,0)
𝑈
  (1) 
 
(Strictly speaking, defensibility is also a function of the initial level of defensive 
investment 𝑏0, but we suppress that in the notation because 𝑏0 is essentially a known 
constant from the perspective of our model.)  Defensibility is normalized to allow 
comparison of systems where value is expressed in different natural units, rather than 
requiring value to be converted to common units such as dollars or utilities.  The 
normalizing constant is chosen to be the full value of the system with no attack or 
defense.  
This function represents the increase in residual value due to defensive 
investment (as a fraction of the initial system value 𝑈).  The defensive investment 𝑏 may 
be discrete or continuous.  For example, consider two systems, embassies and military 
bases, both threatened by hostile militias.  Comparing the improvement in the two 
systems for a large value of 𝑏 may reflect programmatic decisions (such as whether to 
invest in protecting embassies or military bases), while the comparison for a small value 
of 𝑏 may help to support decisions about incremental increases in investment (e.g., 
whether it is worthwhile to improve the protection of one additional embassy).  The 
denominator ensures that the expression is dimensionless and bounded in [0,1], 
allowing incommensurable systems to be compared to each other using a single 
measure.  Thus, the analyst need not specify quantitative differences in importance 
between systems that are believed to be comparable in criticality.  Since the 
denominator 𝑈 is a constant for each system, the measure essentially tracks the effects 
of attack effort (a) and defense effort (b) on the numerator of the function. Here, cost is 
taken into account by the fact that the decision maker must allocate a fixed defensive 
effort or budget b to one or another system; defensibility then reflects the impact that 
allocation would have. 
This definition of Eqn. 1 could be applied to a variety of systems and settings.  In 
the next section we study a restricted setting with discrete assets (all with the same 
protection cost) and binary protection decisions. In this case, the smallest possible 
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investment is 𝑏 = 1; i.e., protection of one asset. More generally, one could consider 
continuous investment decisions (in which case we might be concerned about 
infinitesimal increases in b), or cases where the assets have different protection costs. 
For an example where defensibility could be considered as a function of continuous 
monetary investments, see Levitin (2009), where beyond a certain level of defensive 
investment, the system defensibility becomes zero (in the sense that no further 
investments can be justified).   
Regarding the value function 𝑉(𝑎, 𝑏), there are several important analytical 
cases.  First, there is the case where the system value is simply the sum of the values of 
the individual assets, which we analyze in the next two sections.  A more complex non-
additive case is that of a completely connected network. For example, Metcalfe’s law 
(reviewed in Zhang et al. 2015) postulates that the value of a network will be a quadratic 
function of the number of nodes, due to synergies associated with being part of a 
network. In the general case of complex systems (Page & Miller, 2007; Przemieniecki, 
2000), the quantity 𝑉(𝑎, 𝑏) may not be an analytical expression, and may need to be 
computed from numerical simulations of the system and possible attacks; e.g., using 
system-dynamics models or discrete-event simulations (Ganin et al., 2016; Gutfraind, 
2010).  
In the next two sections we focus on cases where the defender can perfectly 
protect any defended asset, and simply deflects any optimizing attackers to other assets.  
However, in more complex networked systems, the level of defensibility could be 
affected by how the damaged components change system functionality.  For example, 
increasing traffic density on undamaged components could lead to congestion and 
increased travel times, while increasing the electricity flow on undamaged components 
could lead to cascading failures and blackouts.  In such cases, the effect of protecting a 
particular asset may depend not only on its valuation (e.g., its load-carrying capacity), 
but also on the network topology and the position of that asset in the network.  The 
definition of defensibility given above still applies in such cases. 
 
2.2 Defensibility as an optimization criterion 
2.2.1 The system selection problem 
One of the most important applications of defensibility is for evaluating defensive 
investments across systems.   Frequently, policy makers face the following scenario: 
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• A limited defensive budget 𝑏 needs to be allocated among several systems, and 
it may be desirable to allocate the entire investment to a single system (e.g., due 
to of commitment costs or administrative reasons) 
• The systems’ values are not directly or easily comparable to each other (for 
example, the electrical grid and the water-distribution network are both critical, 
but their values are not directly comparable, since they provide distinct services), 
but policy makers would like a metric that allows them to compare systems that 
are all believed to be comparably critical. The threat is unlikely to switch from one 
system to another in response to the observed defensive investment, at least 
within the planning horizon (for example, terrorists that attack civilian targets may 
lack the capability or intent to attack hardened military installations). If that 
assumption is violated, then we are in the arena of systems-of-systems, and the 
defender may wish to calculate the defensibility of the entire system of systems 
at a higher level of analysis.  
 
Defender optimization problem. This problem could be formulated as a constrained 
optimization problem, as follows.  The objective is to maximize the total residual value of 
all critical systems, where the values of all systems are roughly equal, subject to the 
constraint that a single system must receive the entire defensive budget 𝑏.  After 
calculating the defensibility of all systems, the optimal policy is to invest in the system 
with the highest defensibility. 
 
2.2.2 Defensibility in system design 
Another important application of defensibility is in the context of system design.  When a 
system such an infrastructure network is being designed, the planner must consider a 
variety of metrics in the design process – chiefly performance and cost.  The existence 
of threats to the system often adds system vulnerability to the design considerations.  
However, cost or other pragmatic considerations may make it infeasible to design a 
system to achieve low levels of vulnerability. In that case, the design of the system can 
aim to achieve high defensibility – the ability to upgrade the system at a modest cost in 
order to reduce its vulnerability in the future.  Designing for defensibility is analogous to 
buying a real option (Trigeorgis & Tsekrekos, 2018) for lower vulnerability in the future.   
High defensibility might be less onerous to achieve than low vulnerability, and so 
attractive to designers of a variety of systems.  For example, warships may be designed 
 11 
to support future defensive upgrades in case additional defenses become essential at a 
later time (e.g., if adversaries acquire more effective anti-ship weapons).  Similarly, 
desktop computers can be easily upgraded when new vulnerabilities are identified by 
updating the antimalware software. By contrast, one concern that has been raised 
regarding the Internet of Things (the growing network of smart and interconnected 
devices) is that it has not been designed with defensibility in mind, since many of these 
devices cannot be easily upgraded (Jing et al., 2014).  
3. Defensibility for Systems with Discrete Assets 
In this section we apply our ideas to an important special case where the system 
consists of discrete assets and the value of the system is just the sum of the values of 
the assets. Defense is assumed to be binary, so that a defended asset maintains its full 
value, while an attacked asset is assumed to be fully destroyed (value of 0).  These 
assumptions (additive system valuation, and perfect binary defense) clearly represent a 
simplified case, for illustrative purposes.  Note also that readers more interested in 
applications can proceed directly to Section 4 below, which illustrates the idea of 
defensibility through numerical examples with realistic data.   
 We consider in detail both an optimal and a uniform random attacker; of course, 
our model also admits intermediate attack strategies (such as an attacker that prefers 
high-valued assets, but does not observe which assets have been defended, or an 
attacker that values all assets equally, but observes which assets have been defended 
and avoids attacking them).  While there are a variety of possible game-theoretic models 
of security (Bier & Azaiez, 2009), here we focus on a sequential two-stage game with 
perfect information; for a more general discussion of game theory, see Myerson (2013).  
In particular, the defender selects which asset(s) to defend, while the attacker observes 
the defender’s choice(s) and chooses which asset(s) to strike in order to maximize the 
total damage. In the discrete setting considered here, this means that the attacker 
destroys the most valuable 𝑎 of the undefended assets.  This is a common but 
conservative assumption, since in practice, an attacker might attack a less valuable 
asset (e.g., due to insufficient information about the defender’s asset values). 
Alternatively, one could frame the problem in terms of adversarial risk analysis (Banks et 
al., 2016), which avoids the assumption that the defender has perfect information about 
the attacker’s asset values, and simply allows the defender to choose the best possible 
defense in light of the defender’s beliefs about the attacker’s asset values.  Moreover, 
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the random case can be used to represent disruption due to accidents or natural 
disasters that are equally likely to affect any asset, as well as disruption due to an 
attacker who is indifferent or uninformed.   
3.1 Notation 
𝑛 Number of assets in the system  
a Number of assets attacked or disrupted 
b Number of assets defended 
𝑣𝑖  Value of asset i to the defender, 𝑣1 ≥ 𝑣2 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝑣𝑛   
wi  Value of asset i to the attacker  
𝐴𝑖  Probability that asset 𝑖 will be attacked or experiences disruption  
(Note that according to the subjectivist definition of probability, this can be taken 
to be the defender’s subjective probability of attack or disruption, since in reality 
an objective or frequentist probability is likely to be unavailable) 
𝐵𝑖  Indicator variable equal to 1 if asset 𝑖 is defended, and 0 otherwise 
𝑠𝑖 Probability that asset 𝑖 survives  
𝑣𝑖(𝑎, 𝑏) Expected value of asset 𝑖 following an attack or disruption of the system 
𝑉(𝑎, 𝑏) Expected remaining total value of the system after an attack or disruption 
U Initial value of the system, before any attack or defense, U= V(0,0) 
 
3.2 Reformulation of defensibility for discrete assets 
It follows that  
𝑠𝑖 = (1 − 𝐴𝑖) + 𝐴𝑖𝐵𝑖 (2) 
The expected value of asset 𝑖 is then 
𝑣𝑖(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖(𝑎, 𝑏) (3) 
The expected remaining total value of the system is just the sum over the assets 
𝑉(𝑎, 𝑏) = ∑ 𝑣𝑖(𝑎, 𝑏)
𝑖
= ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖(𝑎, 𝑏)
𝑖
 (4) 
Finally, defensibility becomes: 
𝐷(𝑎, 𝑏) =
∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖(𝑎, 𝑏 + 𝑏0)𝑖 − ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖(𝑎, 𝑏0)𝑖
𝑈
  (5) 
 
3.3 Types of attackers, defenders and systems 
For deterministic optimal attackers, we consider two cases:  
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(1) A same-value attacker assigns the same value to each asset as the defender, 
resulting in a zero-sum game.  
(2) A different-value attacker receives a benefit wi for destroying asset i, where in 
general 𝑤𝑖 ≠ 𝑣𝑖. This type of attacker need not satisfy 𝑤1 ≥ 𝑤2 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝑤𝑛, and 
the game is not zero-sum. 
A stochastic attack refers to any disruption (deliberate or natural) that strikes targets 
non-deterministically. A stationary attacker is a special case of a stochastic attacker 
whose probability distribution of attacks does not depend on the defender’s choices. A 
uniform random attacker is a stochastic stationary attacker that strikes targets with 
equal probability; i.e., completely at random.  (Note that in the case of a deterministic 
attacker, whose behavior can be completely predicted from knowledge of the attack 
effort a and the defense effort b, the attack probability 𝐴𝑖 will simply be an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if asset i will be attacked and 0 otherwise—at least if we exclude the 
theoretical case where multiple assets have the same value to the attacker, leading to 
random attack strategies even in the case of perfect information about the attacker.)   
We will see shortly that the distribution of asset values has a strong effect on the 
defensibility of a system. The most important limiting case is that of convex decreasing 
values, where the asset values exhibit decreasing differences in value; i.e., 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖+1 ≥
𝑣𝑖+1 − 𝑣𝑖+2 for all 𝑖 = 1 … 𝑛 − 2. The other limiting case is of concave decreasing values.  
Asset values with decreasing differences will exhibit positive skewness (MacGillivray, 
1986). This reflects the typical situation with a few high-valued assets and a large 
number of low-valued assets.  (Of course, not all positively skewed sets of asset values 
will exhibit decreasing differences, since skewness is a global rather than a local 
property.) By comparison, asset values with increasing differences will have negative 
skewness, reflecting a situation with a large number of near-optimal targets, and only a 
few low-valued targets.  
Yet another situation is when the attacker can choose between attacking a given 
system of interest to the defender and attacking some other system.  In this case, the 
attacker can be modeled as having a nonzero “opportunity cost” of attack, such that the 
system of interest to the defender will no longer be targeted if the maximum possible 
attack damage achievable after defense is less than the attack damage resulting from an 
attack on the other system.  Here, we are again in the case of a system-of-systems.   
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4. Defensibility of Infrastructure Systems 
4.1 Data sets 
We apply the above model to two representative data sets exhibiting positive skewness, 
as well as to a synthetic data set with negative skewness (for illustrative purposes):   
Property Losses. We use data from Willis (Willis, 2007; Willis, Morral, Kelly, & 
Medby, 2005), which provides estimates of the expected annual property losses that 
would result from attacks on different urban areas in the United States.  For simplicity, 
we restrict our attention primarily to the 10 urban areas of the United States that are 
estimated to have the highest expected annual terrorism losses in Willis; see Table 2 
below. Note also that the estimates in from Willis are expected values taking into 
account multiple possible attack types and targets within any one urban area.  However, 
for purposes of illustrating defensibility, we treat them as if they represent attacks on 
discrete assets (e.g., a single signature building in each urban area). Examination of the 
Property Losses data set finds that it generally exhibits decreasing differences (i.e. 
convexity), except for the extremely small differences between Washington and LA, and 
between Philadelphia and Boston. 
Air Departures. We also consider data on the air transportation system.  In this 
data set, the value of an airport is characterized based on the number of departures from 
June 2015 to June 2016 (US Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2016) (Table 2). In 
particular, in each of the 10 urban areas with the highest expected annual terrorism 
losses (according to Willis), we consider the airport with the largest number of air 
departures. 
Negative Skew. Finally, to illustrate defense of systems with a large number of 
similarly-valued targets, we constructed a data set exhibiting negative skewness, with 
asset values of 719, 712, 705, 694, 676, 655, 621, 585, 528, and 413. Note that these 
values show increasing differences; i.e., the asset values are concave and decreasing. 
The three data sets can be usefully characterized based on the skewness of the 
asset valuations. In particular, Property Losses, Air Departures, and Negative Skew 
have skewness values of 2.8, 2.4, and -1.4, respectively.  This has significant 
implications for the defensibility of those systems, as shown below.  
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4.2. Same-value deterministic optimal attackers 
We begin for clarity of illustration with a same-value attacker.  Consider the example 
below (Fig. 2), where the vertical axis represents residual value of the system (as a 
percentage of the total value 𝑈).  The blue lines correspond to the case where residual 
value is measured in terms of property damage, while the difference between the dotted 
blue line and the solid blue line shows the defensibility of the system, 𝐷(1, 𝑏), against an 
attacker of strength 𝑎 = 1 for any given value of 𝑏. In this case, while even a single 
attack can do quite a bit of damage, the extreme skewness of the data set (2.8) is 
associated with high defensibility, even for small values of the defense effort 𝑏.  In fact, 
the average defensibility over all values of 𝑏 = 1 … 10 is more than 53%.   
To illustrate how these results are computed, the total value of all expected 
property losses for the 10 cities is $719 million.  If no assets are defended, the attacker 
is assumed to attack New York and cause $413 million in damage.  Thus, the residual 
value is $719 - $413 = $306 million, or about 42.6% of the total value at risk.  Similarly, 
when one asset is defended, the defender is assumed to protect New York.  Since the 
attacker can observe the defenses, an attack is launched against the second-best target, 
Chicago, causing only $115 million in damage.  At that point, the residual value of the 
system would be $719 - $115 = $604 million, or 84% of the total system value.  The 
same logic applies as larger numbers of targets are protected.   
Fig. 2 also shows that both residual value and defensibility are monotonically 
increasing with 𝑏. In fact, this is provable in general (see Prop’s. 2 and 4 in section 5).  
On the same figure, the red curve (for air departures, with a skewness of 2.4) 
shows an average defensibility over 𝑏 = 1 … 10 of 11%. This value is smaller than for the 
property values because the data set for air departures does not have a single extremely 
high-valued target, thereby reducing the benefit that can be achieved by a modest 
defense effort.  (For example, property losses for an attack on New York are nearly 3.6 
times as large as for the next highest urban area, while air departures from O’Hare are 
only 1.5 times those from LAX, the next most significant asset in the airports data set.) 
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Table 2: Data sets for property losses and air departures 
 
Urban Area 
 
Expected Property 
Losses ($millions) 
 
Air Departures 
(thousands/year), and 
airport code 
 
 
 
Population (millions) 
New York 413 166 (LGA) 9.3 
Chicago 115 375 (ORD) 8.3 
San Francisco   57 172 (SFO) 1.7 
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV   36 140 (DCA) 4.9 
Los Angeles-Long Beach   34 248 (LAX) 9.5 
Philadelphia, PA-NJ   21 171 (PHL) 5.1 
Boston, MA-NH   18 156 (BOS) 3.4 
Houston   11 183 (IAH) 4.2 
Newark     7.3 158 (EWR) 2.0 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett     6.7 174 (SEA) 2.4 
Total 719       1,943             50.9 
    
Expanding our simple illustration, we now consider the defensibility for multiple 
levels of attack effort 𝑎 (𝑎 = 1, 2,4, 10) (Fig. 3).  Defense is more effective for large 𝑎, but 
with diminishing marginal returns: the average defensibility over 𝑏 = 1 … 10 is 53% for 
𝑎 = 1, 76% for 𝑎 = 4, and only 88% for 𝑎 = 10. This is because while total damage of 
course grows in attacker effort 𝑎, for large 𝑎 the additional attack effort is focused on 
relatively low-valued targets. This suggests that defensibility is more sensitive to the 
level of defensive effort, 𝑏, than to the number of targets attacked, 𝑎, when the defensive 
effort is small; again, we have been able to show that this is indeed the case (see Prop. 
5 in section 5). 
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Fig. 2.  Residual value and defensibility for two systems under varying defense 
effort for 𝒂 = 𝟏. Property Loss (blue) exhibits a large increase in residual value when 
defense investment is increased between 𝑏 = 0 and 𝑏 = 1, as compared to Air 
Departures (red), indicating that property is more defensible.  
 
 
Fig. 3.  Residual value under varying levels of attack and defense effort, for an 
optimal attack on the Property Losses data set.   
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4.3 Stochastic attacks 
As mentioned earlier, the concept of defensibility can be applied not only to intentional 
attacks, but also to random (non-strategic) attacks, accidents, or acts of nature.  Fig. 4 
below compares the residual values for optimal and uniform random attacks for the 
highly skewed data set on expected property losses, and finds that the system is actually 
significantly more defensible against an intentional attack (i.e., an attack targeting the 
undefended city with the maximum expected property loss) than it would be against a 
threat that attacked all ten cities randomly (an average of 53% over 𝑏 = 1 … 10 for 
intentional attacks, vs. less than 9% for random attacks).   
In particular, we have been able to show that defensibility will be higher against 
optimal than uniform random attackers when the number of assets is sufficiently large 
(where “large” depends on the attack effort 𝑎 and how quickly the asset values decline; 
see Prop. 9 in section 5).  To understand why this is true, note that when the number of 
possible targets is large as compared to 𝑏, random attacks would be more likely to occur 
at undefended assets, making defense relatively ineffectual.  By contrast, intentional 
attacks will tend to focus on highly valuable targets, making attacks more damaging but 
increasing the benefit of investing in defense – a finding important to counter-terrorism.   
We now return to the question of how attack strength affects defensibility for a 
stochastic attacker. When attacks are random, the residual value after an attack 
depends more strongly on the number of attacks a than in the deterministic case; 
compare Fig. 5 for the random case with Fig. 3 for the deterministic case.  For the 
uniform random case, defensibility averaged over 𝑏 = 1 … 10 is less than 9% for 𝑎 = 1, 
but is nearly 88% for 𝑎 = 10; for the deterministic case the change is smaller (53% vs. 
88%).  (See also Prop. 10 in section 5 below.) 
4.4 Differing attacker and defender valuations 
In the general case, the attacker and defender may assign different valuations to the 
various assets or targets. The mismatch may be the result, for example, of some targets 
being of symbolic value to the attacker (even if their value to the defender is relatively 
low), or simply of the attacker lacking accurate information about the value of targets to 
the defender.  For example, the attacker may wish to attack an airport, but may not know 
which airports have the most departures, or may prefer to target airports in cities with 
large populations (perhaps because of a belief that attacks on airports in high-population 
cities will generate more publicity). In such cases, the impact on the defender could still 
be measured in air departures, even if the attacker is not targeting the busiest airport.   
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Fig. 4.  Residual values after an optimal and a uniform random attack on the 
Property Losses data set. Defensibility is clearly lower against a uniform random 
attacker than against an optimal attacker in this case. 
 
In our model, we find that a mismatch where the attacker chooses which airport 
to target based on population rather than air departures makes defense less efficient; 
i.e., a higher number of targets b must be defended to yield equivalent residual value, if 
the defender is unaware of the attacker’s objective function (Prop. 3 in section 5). The 
situation is illustrated in the graph below (Fig. 6).  In this case, when defending against a 
single attack (𝑎 = 1, the uppermost blue curve), the residual value does not improve at 
all until the defender has protected the top two targets (instead of getting benefit from 
protecting a single target), since defense of the first city (Chicago, with the largest 
number of air departures) was misallocated, given the goals of the attacker.  Moreover, 
the average defensibility for 𝑎 = 1 (over 𝑏 = 1 … 10) is only about 5% (compared to 11% 
if both the attacker chooses which asset t target based on the defender values).   
Since the calculations are more complicated when attackers and defenders have 
different valuations, we provide an illustration of the process.  Referring back to Table 2 
above, when no assets are defended and the attacker can choose only one target, the 
attacker is assumed to target the LAX airport, since Los Angeles is the most populous of 
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the ten cities, and therefore causes disruption of the 248,000 air departures per year at 
LAX.  Thus, the residual value is 1,943,000 - 248,000 = 1,695,000 remaining air 
departures for the duration of the disruption, or about 87.2% of the total (corresponding 
to the blue line in Fig. 6 below).  However, when one asset is defended, the defender is 
assumed to mistakenly protect the Chicago airport, since it has the highest number of air 
departures.  Therefore, no benefit is obtained from the defense, and the residual value is 
still 87.2%.  Only when two assets are defended does the defender begin to protect LAX 
in addition to Chicago, since LAX has the second highest number of air departures.  At 
that point, the attacker moves on to target La Guardia, since New York has the second 
highest population, and causes disruption of the 166,000 air departures per year at La 
Guardia.  At that point, the residual value of the system would be 1,943,000 - 166,000 = 
1,777,000 air departures, or 91.5% of the maximum possible system value.   
 
 
Fig. 5. Residual value under varying levels of attack and defense effort, for a 
uniform random attack on the Property Losses data set.  As in the case of an 
optimal attack, the residual value is monotonically increasing with 𝑏 and decreasing with 
𝑎 (see Prop. 7 for details), and defensibility is increasing in both 𝑎 and 𝑏 (Prop. 8).  
 
 A defender could of course attempt to improve defensibility by protecting the 
assets most likely to be attacked, instead of the most valuable assets.  However, this 
strategy has some obvious pitfalls, including the fact that attacker valuations are typically 
not known. Moreover, when the attacker and defender valuations differ, protecting the 
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asset(s) that are most attractive to the attacker can in some cases cause the attacker to 
shift towards assets that are less attractive to the attacker, but more damaging to the 
defender (Bier et al., 2007b). 
4.5. Negative skew 
As discussed earlier, we also apply the concept of defensibility to a system with a large 
number of comparably high-valued targets.  Clearly, for this data set defensibility against 
an optimal attacker is low until large numbers of components 𝑏 have been defended 
(blue line in Fig. 7), and average defensibility over 𝑏 = 1 … 10 is only about 2.5%.   
 
 
Fig. 6. Residual value for mismatched attacker and defender target values.  When 
a mismatch occurs, the residual value is generally higher than in the case with no 
mismatch, but the defensibility is generally lower (and is often constant in 𝑏, or even 
zero). 
 
 By contrast, defensibility is actually greater against random (non-strategic) 
attacks than against an intentional (optimal) attack—only 2.5% (averaged over 𝑏 =
1 … 10) for intentional attacks, versus 5.9% for random attacks; see Prop. 9.  This is 
because with negative skewness, there are many near-optimal targets with almost the 
same values, so against an optimizing attacker, defense merely deflects the attacker to 
a similar undefended target. The situation is different with the random threat because it 
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does not focus only on high-value targets and will not be displaced from attacking 
defended targets.  Thus, in the negative skew case, defending against the random threat 
gives small but steady improvements in the residual value of the system. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Residual values after an optimal and a uniform random attack on the 
Negative Skew data set. Unlike the previous examples, which all involved data sets 
with positive skewness, defensibility against a random attacker in this case is actually 
greater than against an optimizing attacker.  
5. Analytical Results 
This section proves analytical results about residual value and defensibility. The proofs 
are generally obtained directly from the definition. Unless noted otherwise, we work in 
the setting where the system value is an additive function of the asset values, and the 
attacker and defender assign the same values to the assets.  The assumption of equal 
valuations is relaxed in Property 3 below, which explores the implications of this 
assumption on a system’s defensibility.   
In many settings, we will see that the optimal defensive strategy is “reflexive,” in 
the sense that the defender considers the values of her assets, and protects the 𝑏 
highest-ranked (i.e., highest value) assets. This is perhaps also the easiest case to 
understand. In the alternative strategy of “predictive” defense, the defender defends 
assets by considering which of them are most likely to be attacked.  However, predictive 
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defense may be difficult to implement effectively, since it requires intelligence about the 
attacker's targeting.  Fortunately, reflexive defense, which does not require this 
information, is provably optimal in certain circumstances. 
Note that in what follows, we set the initial defense 𝑏0 to 0 without loss of 
generality.  This is because under our assumption of perfect defense, assets that have 
already been defended will never be attacked by an optimizing attacker, and will never 
be damaged by a uniform random attacker. Thus, we can ignore assets that have 
already been defended. 
5.1 Deterministic attackers 
Property 1: Optimality of reflexive defense 
The reflexive defense strategy is optimal when (1) the attacker is optimizing, and (2) the 
attacker has the same values for all assets as the defender (or at least ranks the assets 
in the same order). 
Proof: The optimal attacker will always strike at the 𝑎 highest-ranked undefended 
assets, where ranking refers to their values: 𝑣1 ≥ 𝑣2 ≥ ⋯ 𝑣𝑛. Consequently, to maximize 
the residual value 𝑉(𝑎, 𝑏), the optimal defense would minimize the total value of the 
assets targeted by the attacker.  It follows that defending the 𝑏 highest ranked (i.e., 
highest-value) assets is an optimal strategy.  QED. 
 
Note that neither of the conditions stated in Property 1 is sufficient by itself; 
alternatives to either one may lead the reflexive strategy to be non-optimal.  (1) A non-
optimizing attacker could respond unpredictably to a defense, and therefore could even 
adopt a more damaging strategy when the defender chooses the reflexive defense.  (2) 
Consider the case where 𝑎 = 1, 𝑏 = 1 and the defender asset values are 10,5,1, while 
the attacker values for those assets are 1,10,5, respectively.  In that case, the reflexive 
defender protecting the first asset (with defender value 10) would suffer an attack on the 
second asset, and be left with a residual value of 10 + 1 = 11, while a defender that 
chose to protect the second asset (with defender value 5) would suffer an attack on the 
third asset, and be left with a residual value of 10 + 5 = 15. 
It follows from Property 1 that in the case of optimal attack and defense: 
𝑉∗(𝑎, 𝑏) = (𝑈 − ∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑏+𝑎
𝑖=𝑏+1
) = ∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑏
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=𝑏+𝑎+1
 (6) 
 
and 
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𝐷∗(𝑎, 𝑏) = [(𝑈 − ∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑏+𝑎
𝑖=𝑏+1
) − (𝑈 − ∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑎
𝑖=1
)] /𝑈 
=
[∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑎
𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑏+𝑎
𝑖=𝑏+1 ]
𝑈
 (7) 
 
Property 2 (Monotonicity of Residual Value) 
Consider the case where (1) the attacker is optimizing and (2) the defender is reflexive.  
Then the residual system value 𝑉(𝑎, 𝑏) is decreasing with 𝑎 and increasing with 𝑏; i.e.,  
𝑉(𝑎 + 1, 𝑏) ≤ 𝑉(𝑎, 𝑏) 
𝑉(𝑎, 𝑏) ≤ 𝑉(𝑎, 𝑏 + 1) 
Proof: By direct inspection of the derivations above. 
 
Property 3: Same/Different Valuations.  The residual value in the case of same values 
would be not less than the residual value in the case of differing values: 
𝑉𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒(𝑎, 𝑏) ≤ 𝑉𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) 
when (1) the attacker is optimizing his value and (2) the defender is optimizing her value. 
Proof: We denote the defender and attacker values for the surviving assets as 𝑉(𝑎, 𝑏) 
and 𝑊(𝑎, 𝑏), respectively.  Suppose (𝑥𝑠, 𝑦𝑠) is an optimal defense strategy and attack 
strategy pair, in the case where the values of the assets are the same to both attacker 
and defender; i.e., 𝑉(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑊(𝑎, 𝑏). From Prop. 1, we know that in this case, the 
defender protects the 𝑏 highest ranked targets, and the attacker strikes targets with 
ranks 𝑏 + 1 … 𝑏 + 𝑎.  This is the maximal damage the attacker could inflict, as viewed by 
the defender.  
Now, suppose the attacker’s values change; i.e. 𝑉(𝑎, 𝑏) ≠ 𝑊(𝑎, 𝑏). The defender 
can continue with defense 𝑥𝑠.  If the attacker maintains the same attack strategy 𝑦𝑠, the 
residual value will be unchanged, and if he changes the attack strategy, the residual 
value 𝑉(𝑎, 𝑏) would either increase or remain the same; it cannot decrease, because 𝑦𝑠 
minimizes the residual value. The defender could even find an improved strategy 𝑥𝑑, 
which would further increase the residual value. QED. 
 
Property 4 (Monotonicity of Defensibility): Defensibility is monotonically increasing in 
𝑎 and 𝑏, when (1) the attacker is optimizing and (2) the defender is reflexive. 
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Proof (monotonicity in 𝒂): 
𝐷(𝑎 + 1, 𝑏) − 𝐷(𝑎, 𝑏) =
[∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑎+1
𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑏+𝑎+1
𝑖=𝑏+1 ] − [∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑎
𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑏+𝑎
𝑖=𝑏+1 ]
𝑈
 
=
𝑣𝑎+1 − 𝑣𝑏+𝑎+1
𝑈
≥ 0 
where the inequality follows because the assets are sorted in order of decreasing value.  
Proof (monotonicity in 𝒃): This follows directly from monotonicity of residual value 
(Property 2).  QED. 
 
Property 5: Sensitivity of defensibility to a and b 
Defensibility is more sensitive to increasing 𝑏 than to increasing 𝑎 iff 𝑏 ≤ 𝑎.   
Proof:  
𝐷(𝑎 + 1, 𝑏) − 𝐷(𝑎, 𝑏) − [𝐷(𝑎, 𝑏 + 1) − 𝐷(𝑎, 𝑏)] = 𝐷(𝑎 + 1, 𝑏) − 𝐷(𝑎, 𝑏 + 1) 
= [
∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑎+1
𝑖=1 −∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑏+𝑎+1
𝑖=𝑏+1
𝑈
] − [
∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑎
𝑖=1 −∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑏+𝑎+1
𝑖=𝑏+2
𝑈
] = [
𝑣𝑎+1−𝑣𝑏+1
𝑈
] ≤ 0 iff 𝑏 ≤ 𝑎.  
 
5.2 Stochastic attackers 
This section is concerned with attacks that cannot be predicted with certainty.  This is 
particularly relevant for disruptions from accidents or natural events, but may also be 
representative of attackers that are opportunistic, or simply not well understood by the 
defender. 
Recall that we distinguish between: 
(1) Stationary attack: the attacker (or disruption) does not change the probability of 
attacking a particular asset in response to defensive actions.  
(2) Uniform random attack: a special case of a stationary attack that attacks all 
assets with equal probability. 
A precise specification of the uniform random attack is as follows: The attacker selects 𝑎 
targets out of 𝑛 possible targets.  Thus, the probability that a given asset will be targeted 
is given by 
(𝑛−1𝑎−1)
(𝑛𝑎)
=
𝑎
𝑛
, as expected by intuition. 
 
Property 6: Optimality of a reflexive defense for uniform random attacker 
The reflexive defense strategy is optimal when the attacker is uniform random. 
Proof: Absent defense, the residual value is given by 
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𝑉𝑅(𝑎, 0) = (1 −
𝑎
𝑛
) ∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (8) 
Given 𝑛 assets, defense budget 𝑏 and 𝑎 strikes, the increase in the residual value from 
defending a set 𝑋 is given by 𝛥 =
𝑎
𝑛
∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑖∈𝑋 .  The maximal gain is achieved by defending 
the 𝑏 highest-rank assets.  QED. 
From here we obtain that the optimal defense to random attacks achieves a 
residual value given by: 
𝑉𝑅(𝑎, 𝑏) = ∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑏
𝑖=1
+ (1 −
𝑎
𝑛
) ∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=𝑏+1
 (9) 
and a defensibility of: 
𝐷𝑅(𝑎, 𝑏) =
𝑎
𝑛
∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑏
𝑖=1
𝑈⁄  (10) 
 
 
Property 7: Monotonicity of Residual Value for Uniform Random Attack 
For uniform random attackers and optimal defense, the residual value is monotonically 
decreasing with 𝑎 and increasing with 𝑏. 
Proof: The result is true by inspection of the functional form of 𝑉𝑅(𝑎, 𝑏). 
 
Property 8: Monotonicity of Defensibility in the Uniform Random Case 
When the attacker is uniform random, defensibility is increasing in both 𝑎 and 𝑏. 
Proof: The result is immediate from the linear form of the function for 𝐷𝑅(𝑎, 𝑏). 
 
Notice that both here and in the deterministic case, defensibility is increasing in 
both 𝑎 and 𝑏. 
  
Property 9: Defensibility against Random and Optimal Attackers 
Let 𝐷∗(𝑎, 𝑏) and 𝐷𝑅(𝑎, 𝑏) be the defensibility against optimizing and uniform random 
attackers, respectively, with an optimizing defender.  Then we have 
𝐷∗(𝑎, 𝑏) ≥ 𝐷𝑅(𝑎, 𝑏) 
if and only if 
∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑎
𝑖=1
≥ ∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑏+𝑎
𝑖=𝑏+1
+
𝑎
𝑛
∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑏
𝑖=1
 (11) 
Proof: By direct expansion. 
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This implies that under mild conditions, defensibility is greater against optimizing 
attackers.  For example, it is sufficient that  
(1) 𝑎 ≪ 𝑛; i.e. the number of assets is large, and 
(2) Any consecutive set of 𝑎 assets (by rank) has a sufficiently larger value than the 
following set of 𝑎 assets.  As a special case, it sufficient that 𝑣𝑖 > 𝑣𝑖+1 + 𝜖 for all 𝑖 
and some constant 𝜖 > 0. 
The result appears paradoxical, because it suggests that it can be easier in some cases 
to defend against “better” attackers. To see why this happens, consider a system with a 
large number of assets but only a few high-value assets. In this system, defensibility 
against an optimal attacker is quite high because the defender can achieve large gains 
by protecting her top assets, but against a uniform random attacker, defensibility is low 
because the attacker is unpredictable, and is likely to target assets that have not been 
protected.   
The opposite case occurs when the system has many comparable high-value 
assets.  It may actually be easier to defend such a system against a random attacker 
than against an optimizing attacker.  In particular, in such a system, a random attacker 
may occasionally target a defended asset purely by chance (yielding a significant benefit 
of defense), but for modest values of 𝑏, there is little gain from defending against an 
optimizing attacker (who will just be deflected to another target that is almost as valuable 
as those that have been defended).   
For a numerical example, consider the case where 𝑛 = 3, 𝑎 = 2, 𝑏 = 1.  We then 
get 𝐷∗(2,1) = 𝑣1 − 𝑣3 and 𝐷𝑅(2,1) =
2
3
𝑣1. Suppose the asset values are 9.0, 8.5, 6.0 – 
decreasing and concave.  Then, 𝐷𝑅(2,1) =
6
23.5
> 𝐷∗(2,1) =
3
23.5
.  However, if the values 
are 9.0, 3.0, 2.0 (decreasing but convex), then we have 𝐷𝑅(2,1) =
6
14
< 𝐷∗(2,1) =
7
14
.  
We now characterize the minimum number of assets for defensibility to be 
greater against an optimal attacker for the case of a geometric series.  For example, if 
𝑣𝑖+1 = 𝛾𝑣𝑖 for 𝑖 = 2,3, . . , 𝑛 − 1 with 𝛾 ∈ (0,1), then ∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=𝑝 = 𝛾
𝑝−1𝑣1
1−𝛾𝑞−𝑝+1
1−𝛾
, we obtain  
𝐷∗(𝑎, 𝑏) − 𝐷𝑅(𝑎, 𝑏) =
𝛾𝑝−1𝑣1
𝑉
(1 − 𝛾𝑎) − 𝛾𝑏(1 − 𝛾𝑎) −
𝑎
𝑛 (1 − 𝛾
𝑏)
1 − 𝛾
≥ 0 
(1 − 𝛾𝑎)[1 − 𝛾𝑏] ≥
𝑎
𝑛
(1 − 𝛾𝑏) (12) 
i.e., 𝐷∗(𝑎, 𝑏) ≥ 𝐷𝑅(𝑎, 𝑏) if 𝑛 ≥ 𝑎/(1 − 𝛾
𝑎) and any value of 𝑏.  For 𝑎 = 2 and 𝛾 = 0.5, 
defensibility against optimal attackers is higher than against random attackers for 𝑛 ≥ 3.  
 28 
Property 10: Sensitivity of defensibility to random and optimal attacker 
Consider the sensitivity of defensibility to attacker effort, in the cases (1) optimal attacker 
and, (2) uniform random attackers, i.e., (1) 𝛥𝑎𝐷∗ =  𝐷∗(𝑎 + 1, 𝑏) − 𝐷∗(𝑎, 𝑏) and (2) 
𝛥𝑎𝐷𝑅 = 𝐷𝑅(𝑎 + 1, 𝑏) − 𝐷𝑅(𝑎, 𝑏). Then  
𝛥𝑎𝐷∗ > 𝛥𝑎𝐷𝑅 
if and only if  
𝑣𝑎+1 − 𝑣𝑎+𝑏+1
𝑈
>
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑏
𝑖=1
𝑈
 (12) 
 
Proof: By direct calculation. 
The result implies that 𝛥𝑎𝐷∗ > 𝛥𝑎𝐷𝑅 when 𝑛 is sufficiently large (where 
sufficiently depends on the values of 𝑎 and 𝑏). It is not necessary to have a large value 
of 𝑛. For example, in the case of the geometric asset values (i.e., 𝑣𝑖+1 = 𝛾𝑣𝑖), one can 
show that 𝛥𝑎𝐷∗ > 𝛥𝑎𝐷𝑅 when 𝑛 ≥ [(1 − 𝛾)𝛾
𝑎]−1. For example, with 𝛾 = 0.9 and 𝑎 = 2, 
𝑛 = 13 is sufficient.  Notice that this expression does not depend on 𝑏. It is also possible 
to obtain 𝛥𝑎𝐷∗ < 𝛥𝑎𝐷𝑅, for example, in the cases where the difference 𝑣𝑎+1 − 𝑣𝑎+𝑏+1 is 
vanishingly small. 
6. Discussion 
Security analysis to date has been intently focused on existing notions such as 
vulnerability and resilience.  Our analysis here is based on the observation that some at-
risk systems may be relatively easy to defend, while others may be difficult to defend 
even with considerable analytical and resource investments.  Based on this observation, 
we proposed a new index, defensibility.  We illustrated a number of properties of the 
defensibility function and proved a number of basic results in the important special case 
of discrete assets with additive values. 
Defensibility can be computed from the (expected) attack damage before and 
after defense.  Systems may have low attack damage before defense and also low 
defensibility, high attack damage before defense but high defensibility, high attack 
damage coupled with low defensibility, or (conceivably) low attack damage with relatively 
high defensibility. Systems with both high attack damage and high defensibility are the 
best candidates for defensive investments, when considering multiple critical systems 
competing for the same resources.  By contrast, when systems have high attack 
damage but poor defensibility, alternatives other than traditional defense may need to be 
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considered (e.g., deterring attacks by threats of retaliation, or intelligence and 
interdiction to interrupt attacks in the planning stages). 
To summarize, our main contribution is to consider defensibility as a basic 
characteristic of system security.  We argue that risk analysts and managers would 
benefit from considering defensibility as part of a security assessment.  Indeed, as our 
proofs show, its properties reflect key aspects of system security in sometimes 
unintuitive but informative ways.   
In particular, defensibility, unlike attack damage, allows policy makers to better 
determine which systems should receive improvements, while avoiding wasteful 
investments in systems that are not amenable to meaningful defense. The concept of 
defensibility could in principle be applied to almost any system or scenario considered by 
risk analysts, and thus has important implications for risk analysis theory and practice.   
6.1 Directions for future work  
There are many possible extensions of this work.  An important problem is 
characterizing defensibility in the case of imperfect attackers that nonetheless exhibit 
more intelligence than the uniform random case.  For example, an attacker might 
observe defenses imperfectly rather than optimally, and shift attack strategy accordingly, 
or may observe defenses perfectly, but be equally likely to attack any undefended asset.  
Alternatively, an attacker may have non-uniform attack probabilities (e.g., with the 
likelihood of choosing a given target being proportional to its valuation), but may be 
unable to observe system defenses.  We leave such cases for the future. 
It is clear that the concept of defensibility could also be applied to much more 
complex defense scenarios.  Unlike in our examples, the cost of defending assets varies 
from asset to asset.  Moreover, in reality no asset is ever perfectly defended; the 
remaining value of an asset after attack could be stochastic, or a fraction of the original 
asset value. More broadly, while we focused here on the case of independent assets, in 
many interesting cases the assets are interdependent (Buldyrev et al., 2010; Havlin et 
al., 2014).  Indeed, critical infrastructure is often organized in the form of a network 
(Ganin et al., 2016; Murray & Grubesic, 2007). In that case (which we leave largely 
unexplored), the value of the system is not an additive function of the asset values, but 
for example may be a supermodular (synergistic) function of the values of those assets 
that survive the attack.  Additionally, while our focus has been on damage, the resilience 
of the system could also be improved. We hypothesize that just like there are high-
damage yet highly defensible systems, a similar situation may occur for resilience – low-
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resilience systems could have either high or low defensibility. Going further, just as 
defensibility examines the changes in the system value in response to defense effort, 
systems could be also characterized in terms of their response to increasing attack effort 
(e.g., whether additional attack effort causes accelerating damage, or diminishing 
marginal returns). 
To conclude, we introduced the concept of defensibility to assist in determining 
how best to improve system defenses.  We showed that defensibility depends in 
interesting ways both on the distribution of asset values in the system, and on the nature 
of the threat.  We argue that defensibility is an important property that could applied to a 
variety of defense contexts.  
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